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Abstract.  
Multi-server authentication complies with the up-to-date requirements of internet services and latest 
applications. The multi-server architecture enables the expedient authentication of subscribers on an 
insecure channel for the delivery of services. The users rely on a single registration of a trusted third 
party for the procurement of services from various servers. Recently, Chen and Lee, Moon et al. and 
Wang et al. presented multi-server key agreement schemes, which are found to be vulnerable to many 
attacks according to our analysis. The Chen and Lee scheme was found susceptible to impersonation 
attack; trace attack, stolen smart card attack exposing session key, key-compromise impersonation 
attack and inefficient password modification. The Moon et al. is susceptible to stolen card attack leading 
to further attacks, i.e. identity-guessing, key-compromise impersonation attack, user impersonation attack, 
and session keys disclosure. While, Wang et al. is also found to be prone to trace attack, session-specific 
temporary information attack, key-compromise information attack, and privileged insider attack leading to 
session key disclosure and user impersonation attacks. We propose an improved protocol countering the 
indicated weaknesses of these schemes in an equivalent cost. Our scheme demonstrates automated and 
security analysis based on BAN logic, and also presents the performance evaluation for related schemes.  
Keywords: Multi-server authentication, remote authentication, biometrics, attacks,  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Multi-server authentication fulfills the modern-age 
requirements of internet-based services, in 
comparison with single-server authentication. 
Multi-server authentication (MSA) enables the 
verification of users for various services out of a 
single registration. The MSA environment is 
beneficial to both users and servers equally, 
since the users are relieved of memorizing 
multiple passwords that would, otherwise, be 
required for each service it registers. At the 
same time, the MSA environment relieves the 
servers of performing separate registrations for 
every user. The MSA architecture involves three 
participating entities, i.e. user, servers (also 
termed as service providers), and registration 
centre (RC). In the initialization stage, the RC 
being a trusted third party registers the users 
and servers employing confidential paths. 
Thereafter, the users could get the stipulated 
services directly from servers after mutual 
authentication phase on insecure channel. 
Alternatively, the trust, in MSA environment, 
transfers from RC towards user and servers.  
   The first simple authentication scheme was 
presented by Lamport in 1981 [1]. Then, these 
schemes evolve from password-based schemes to 
smart-card [2], biometric-based schemes and 
ultimately towards multi-server authentication 
schemes [3-6]. Since a decade, we witnessed 
several multi-server authentication techniques. 
Yet, the practical implications call for presenting 
more computationally efficient and secure MSA 
protocols. In this connection Li et al. [3] 
presented a pioneer multi-server authentication 
scheme for neural networks. However, 
according to Lin et al. [4], the Li et al. scheme 
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takes much time to train neural networks, and 
presented an improved protocol embedding 
ElGamal digital signature and geometric 
features on the Euclidean plane. Next, Juang [5] 
proposed a symmetric cryptography-based MSA 
scheme, but it has scalability issues due to the 
maintenance of verifier table on the end of 
server for every user. Afterwards, Tsaur [6] put 
forward a remote user-based authentication 
protocol relying on RSA cryptography and 
Lagrange interpolating polynomial. It is worthy 
to note that there have been presented many 
public key cryptography (PKC) -based schemes 
for MSA [6, 11-23] though, the symmetric key 
schemes are still preferable for low-end mobile 
devices with scarce resources. Following the 
pace on symmetric crypto-based light weight 
protocols, Chang and Lee [7] presented another 
MSA based scheme which was found exposed to 
insider attacks, and server and RC spoofing 
attacks [8]. Liao and Wang [8], afterwards, 
presented a remote user dynamic ID based 
authentication scheme for MSA framework. 
Then, Hsiang and Shih [9] found the scheme [8] 
to be vulnerable for masquerading and insider 
attacks and also presented an improved scheme. 
Lee et al. [10] found that [9] does not provide 
mutual authentication, and presented its own 
improved protocol. However, Chen and Lee [24] 
found that [10] does not provide smart card 
based two-factor security, and suffers 
masquerading attack. Besides, that scheme 
utilize an inefficient password updating 
procedure that involves RC each time, the 
password is changed. After discovering 
weaknesses in [10], Chen and Lee scheme also 
presented an improved scheme. After a careful 
analysis of the Chen and Lee’s protocol [24], we 
observe that the scheme is prone to stolen smart 
card attack that may further lead towards 
password and session key disclosure. The 
scheme is also susceptible to impersonation and 
trace attacks. Besides, the protocol [24] 
undergoes a faulty password modification 
procedure. Recently, Moon et al. [25] and Wang et 
al. [26] presented multi-server authenticated key 
agreement schemes, which are found to be prone to 
many attacks according to our analysis. The Moon 
et al. is prone to privileged insider attack, identity-
guessing attack, and session key disclosure. While, 
Wang et al. is found to be vulnerable to trace 
attack, session specific temporary information 
attack, key-compromise information attack and 
privileged insider attack. The current study work 
reviews Chen and Lee, Moon et al. and Wang et 
al. schemes [24-26] with the demonstration of 
working and cryptanalysis. Finally it presents an 
improved protocol version including formal 
security analysis. Moreover, the protocol has 
been incorporated by automated tool analysis 
and BAN logic-based security analysis.  
The section 2 relates to preliminaries defining 
hash function and bio-hashing. Section 3 takes 
into account the reviews of Chen and Lee 
scheme, Moon et al. and Wang et al. schemes. 
Section 4 discusses the proposed model. The 
section 5 presents informal security analysis. 
Section 6 exhibits automated analysis, formal 
analysis and performance evaluation. Section 7 
summarizes the paper findings. 
 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
The preliminary section describes properties of 
hash and bio-hashing functions as used in the 
proposed contribution.  
 
2.1 Multi-server authentication 
architecture 
In Multi-server authentication (MSA) 
architecture [49-50, 56-59], the users get 
registered through a centralized control centre. 
Thereafter, the users may get services of 
authorized service providers without re-
registration. However, the users must perform 
mutual authentication procedure to qualify for 
service provision. Unlike, single server 
authentication, the MSA architecture relieves 
the subscribers of registrations from multiple 
service providers separately. The MSA 
environment embraces three interacting 
entities, that is, user (Ui), service providers (Sj), 
and registration centre (RC) as shown in figure 
1. The RC acting as a centralized control centre, 
registers all subscribers and servers on 
confidential channels in initializing phase. This 
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lets the subscribers to get the services from 
servers either directly without getting RC 
engaged, or indirectly by engaging RC in mutual 
authentication phase. Alternatively, we can say 
that trust is transferred from RC towards all 
entities subject to RC, since, the former acts as a 
trusted third party to authenticate the entities 
(users and servers). 
  
Figure 1. MSA-architecture  
 
2.2 Hash function 
we describe the properties of a secure one-way 
hash function, i.e. h:{0,1}* → {0,1}ℓ, where ℓ 
represents a secure length, that generates a 𝑦′ 
string of fixed length as output, by taking a 
variable length string 𝑥′ as input, i.e., 𝑦′= h(𝑥′), 
as following: 
1. It is a hard problem to modify the message m 
without modifying the digest h(m). 
2. It is intractable to create a message m that 
generates h(m) as preimage resistance. 
3. It is intractable to find the numbers m1 and m2 
such that m1 is not equal to m2 while h(m1) 
equates h(m2) simultaneously. 
2.3 Bio-hashing 
The biometric parameters BIOi behaves 
somehow, in a different manner, every time 
these are collected. The biohash H(.) function 
generates a compact set of codes, for the user 
after bringing randomness, by introducing 
random salt in the function. Alternatively, H(.) 
transforms the extracted finger or facial codes F 
along with the random salt into biocodes B, 
while the hamming distance is used to 
distinguish the two biocodes. In this manner, the 
use of bio-hashing may comfortably thwart the 
de-synchronization attack, along with other 
attacks [52-53]. 
2.4  Attack model 
 
An attacker is supposed to be having following 
capabilities [27-35]. 
1. An attacker may steal the smart card 
contents by power analysis and reverse 
engineering procedures. 
2. An adversary may intercept, eavesdrop, 
modify, and replay messages over a public 
channel. 
3. An adversary might be an insider i.e. 
legitimate user or a server having malicious 
intentions. 
4. An adversary might guess a low entropy 
password and identity of a user. 
 
3. WORKING AND LIMITATIONS IN  
CHEN AND LEE’s, MOON ET AL.’s, AND 
WANG ET AL.’s SCHEMES 
Since, the three multi-server authentication 
schemes, i.e. Chen and Lee, Moon et al. and 
Wang et al. share a single property of a secret 
key sharing, in which a registration authority 
shares a single secret with all service providers. 
On the basis of that shared secret, the service 
providers verify the authenticity of a subscriber. 
All of the three schemes have been reviewed in 
this study work. The working and cryptanalysis 
details for these schemes are described below: 
3.1 Chen and Lee scheme 
. 
 . 
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This section presents the design and limitations 
of Chen and Lee scheme [24] as illustrated 
below: 
3.1.1 Working of Chen and Lee scheme 
In Chen and Lee scheme, a trusted RC registers 
the servers Sj by issuing a unique secret PIDj 
using secure channel. The Chen and Lee scheme 
comprises three phases, i.e. Registration phase, 
Login and Authentication phase, as depicted in 
Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  Chen and Lee model Registration, Login and Authentication phase 
 
a) The Registration Phase 
The user Ui gets registered by adopting the 
under-mentioned procedure with registration 
centre: 
1. Firstly, the user selects IDi, PWDi, and also 
generates a random integer r. Then, it 
computes h(r PWDi), and submits {IDi, 
h(r PWDi)} to RC for the purpose of 
registration. 
2. RC, then computes Ii = h(h(r PWDi)), Oi = 
h(Ii||h(x||y)), Ei= Mi h(r PWDi), Ji = h(IDi 
||x), Ji=h(IDi||x), Li =Jih(IDi||h(r PWDi)) 
and Ri = h(Ji). Next, RC stores in smart card 
{Ei, Ri, Li, h(y)} and sends towards user.  
3. Ui gets smart card and in addition, stores 
the parameter r in it.  
b)  The Login and Authentication procedure 
1. In login phase the user gets authenticated 
access from Sj through RC. For this reason 
Smart card { Ei, Ri, Li, h(y)} 
{IDi, h(r PWDi)} 
Ii = h(h(r PWDi)) 
Oi = h(Ii || h (x || y)) 
Ei = Oi h(r PWDi) 
Ji = h(IDi || x) 
Li = Ji h(IDi || h(r PWDi)) 
Ri = h(Ji) 
1.The user inputs IDi, PWDi 
Ji= Li h(IDi || h(r  PWDi)) 
Ri*= h(Ji), Checks Ri* ?= Ri 
Generates a random number Ni 
Oi = Ei h(r PWDi) 
Ii = h(h(r PWDi)) 
Gij = Ii h(h(y) || SIDj || Ni) 
ZIDi = h(r  PWDi)h(Ji ||Oi || Ni) 
Hij = Jih(Oi || Ni || SIDj) 
Ci =h(Ei || Oi || Ni) 
REGISTRATION PHASE: 
m1= { ZIDi, Gij, Hij, Ci, Ni } 
2.  Ii = Gijh(h(y) || SIDj || Ni) 
Oi = h(Ii || h(x || y)) 
Ji = Hijh(Oi || Ni || SIDj) 
h(r PWDi)=ZIDi h(Ji ||Oi || Ni) 
Ei = Oi h(r PWDi) 
h(Ei || Oi || Ni) ?= Ci 
Generates a random number Nj 
Mij = h(Ei || Ni || Oi || SIDj) 
Ui receives smart card 
and inserts r additionally 
User (Ui) Server (Sj) 
User (Ui) Registration Centre (RC) 
LOGIN AND AUHTHENTICATION 
PHASE: 
3.  h(Ei || Ni || Oi || SIDj) ?=Mij 
Mij' = h(Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj) 
 
 
 
SK= h(Ni || Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj) 
 
m3 = {Mij'} 
4.    Check 
h(Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj) ?=   Mij' 
SK= h(Ni || Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj) 
 
m2 = {Mij, Nj} 
Selects IDi, PWDi, r 
Compute h(r PWDi) 
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the user inputs its identity IDi and 
password PWDi. Then SC computes Ji= Li 
h(IDi || h(r PWDi)), Ri*= h(Ji), and 
checks the equation Ri* ?= Ri. If true, then 
generates a random integer Ni to further 
compute Oi = Ei h(rPWDi), Ii= 
h(h(rPWDi)), Gij = Ii h(h(y) || SIDj || Ni), 
ZIDi = h(r PWDi) h(Ji ||Oi || Ni), Hij = 
Ji h(Oi || Ni || SIDj), Ci =h(Ei || Oi || Ni) 
and sends the message m1= { ZIDi, Gij, Hij, 
Ci, Ni } to RC. 
2. Sj receives the request m1= { ZIDi, Gij, Hij, 
Ci, Ni } and computes Ii= Gij h(h(y) || SIDj 
|| Ni), Oi = h(Ii|| h(x || y)), Ji = Hij h(Oi || 
Ni || SIDj), h(rPWDi)= ZIDi h(Ji || Oi || 
Ni) and Ei = Oi  h(rPWDi). Next, it 
compares the equation h(Ei || Oi || Ni) ?= 
Ci. If it holds true, it further generates a 
random integer Nj to compute Mij = h(Ei || 
Ni || Oi || SIDj) and submits the message m2 
= {Mij, Nj} to Ui to proceed for 
authentication. 
3. Next, the user Ui constructs h(Ei || Ni || Oi || 
SIDj) and then compares the equation h(Ei 
|| Ni || Oi || SIDj) ?=Mij. If true then 
computes Mij' = h(Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj) and 
this m3 = {Mij'} to RC for final verification 
with Nj based challenge. 
4. The RC receives m3 and checks equality 
h(Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj) ?= Mij' after 
computing h(Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj). If the 
match occurs, it finally develops the session 
key with user as SK= h(Ni || Ei || Nj || Oi || 
SIDj). 
 
3.1.2      Weaknesses in Chen and Lee scheme. 
The Chen and Lee scheme is found susceptible 
to stolen card attack, user impersonation attack, 
trace attack, key-compromise impersonation 
attack and costly password modification phase 
as described below. 
a)  Stolen smart card Attack 
An attacker Ӑ could launch a stolen smart card 
attack, if it happens to approach the card 
accidentally [51]. As the smart card bears the 
{Li, Ei, Ri, h(y)} and the publicly available 
messages are m1= { ZIDi, Gij, Hij, Ci, Ni }, m2 = 
{Mij, Nj} and m3 = {Mij'}. Since Ni and SIDj are 
publicly accessible, and h(y) could be approached 
from stolen card. Then, an adversary could 
construct h(h(y) || Ni || SIDj) and access the Ii* 
parameter by computing Ii* = Gij  h(h(y) || Ni || 
SIDj). Next, due to the availability of ’r’ random 
number in SC, it could launch an offline dictionary 
attack for guessing the right password. It tries all 
dictionary combinations of PWDi* and match with 
Ii* = h(h(rPWDi*) repeatedly by computing and 
checking the equation h(h(rPWDi*) ?= Ii*.  
Wherever it matches, there comes the right 
password for adversary.  
    After guessing the password PWDi it may 
compute h(r PWDi), and Oi' by performing Oi'= 
h(r PWDi)  Ei. Next, it could easily generate 
the legitimate session key by implementing the 
hash function as h(Ni || Ei || Nj || Oi' || SIDj). This 
way, an adversary guesses the shared session key 
SK between the participants by stealing the smart 
card. Hence the scheme is susceptible to stolen 
card attack.  
b) User impersonation Attack 
The Chen and Lee scheme is susceptible to user 
impersonation attack, subject to the availability to 
SC contents. Using SC contents Ӑ may construct a 
valid PWDi according to the procedure defined 
above. Next, Ӑ computes Oi = Ei h(r PWDi) 
and Ii = h(h(r PWDi)). Next, it guesses IDi by 
trying all of the possible strings IDi* using these 
two statements, Ji*= Li  h(IDi*||h(rPWDi)) 
and Ri ?= h(Ji*),  repeatedly. If the equality hits, 
then the valid IDi and Ji* are located. Next, it 
assumes a random number Ni and computes Gij = 
Ii  h(h(y)||Ni ||SIDj), ZIDi = h(rPWDi) h(Ji 
||Oi|| Ni), Hij =Ji  h(Oi || Ni || SIDj) and Ci 
=h(Ei||Oi||Ni). Finally, it constructs login request 
message m1= {ZIDi, Gij, Hij, Ci, Ni } successfully. 
c) Trace Attack 
In a trace attack, an adversary may trace the 
consistency among various sessions created 
between the same participants in different periods 
of time. In Chen and Lee, a malicious insider, 
having the knowledge of h(y), may intercept the 
message m1={ ZIDi, Gij, Hij, Ci, Ni } and attempt 
to find the symmetry among various sessions by 
finding Ii after computing Ii = Gij  h(h(y) || SIDj 
|| Ni). The Ii parameter remains the same for all 
sessions established between the Ui and Sj, until 
the PWi or r are changed in smart card. Hence, the 
Chen and Lee scheme is susceptible to trace attack. 
d)   Key-Compromise Impersonation attack (KCI) 
In this attack, an adversary may use the recovered 
or stolen secret parameter of a user to masquerade 
it as a server. The Chen and Lee scheme is 
susceptible to KCI attack, once the smart card 
contents are stolen by an attacker. After 
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password recovery of user, as shown in sub-
section 3.1.2 (a), the adversary may easily 
masquerade as server by constructing the 
message m2 = {Mij, Nj} after generating a random 
number Nj, and computing Mij* as Mij* 
=h(Ei||Nj||Oi|| SIDj). Since, Ei and Vi parameters 
can be constructed by manipulating SC parameters 
as shown in section 3.1.2 (b). This message m2 will 
be sent towards user, which will be duly verified 
by user, though fake. In this manner, a successful 
masquerading attack can be initiated against user in 
Chen and Lee scheme.   
e) No session key security 
Once, the parameters Ei and Oi are recovered by an 
adversary using stolen smart card contents, it may 
compute all previous session keys by intercepting 
Ni, Nj and constructing the session key as SK= 
h(Ni || Ei || Nj || Oi || SIDj). 
 
Figure 3. Moon et al. registration and login & authentication phase 
f) No direct password modification  
The author claims that Ui does not resort to RC for 
changing the password, however, the current Chen 
and Lee scheme has no way for the user to modify 
the PWDi without engaging RC. The password 
modification involves the update of Ei = Oi  
h(rPWDi), every time the PWDi is changed. 
While, Ri is used for the construction of Oi, as Oi 
= h(Ii || h (x || y)). Additionally, the parameter Ii is 
a function of the password as Ii = h(h(r PWDi)). 
Hence, the Ui will have to resort to RC each time, 
SC {Gi, Pi, Hi, Ai, h()} 
{IDi, PWDi } 2. Select  yi 
   Gi = h(IDi || PWDi), 
 Pi = h(yi || PSK)  IDi, 
  Hi = h(IDi ||x ), 
  Ai = yi   h(PSK) 
1. The user inputs IDi, PWi, and 
then imprints biometric Bi to 
compute  
PWDi*=h (PWi||H(Bi)) 
Checks Gi ?= h(IDi || PWDi*) 
Generates a random number Ni 
K = h((Pi   IDi ) || SIDj), 
Generate n1, 
M1= K  IDi, M2= n1  K, 
M3=K  PWDi, 
Mi= h(Hi || n1 || PWDi || T1) 
REGISTRATION PHASE: 
m1= { Ai, Mi, M1, M2, M3, T1 } 
2.  Check |Tc-T1| <= ΔT, 
yi=Ai   h(PSK), 
K=h(h(yi || PSK ) || SIDj) 
n1= M2  K, IDi = M1  K, 
PWDi =M3   K, Hi = h(IDi || x), 
Mi ?= h(Hi || n1 || PWDi || T1), 
Generate n2, 
M4=n2   h(n1 || PWDi || Hi), 
M5=h(IDi || n1 || n2 || K || T2), 
SKij = h(n1 || n2 || K || Hi) 
 
3. Ui  receives and stores SC 
safely. 
User (Ui) Server (Sj) 
User (Ui) Registration Centre (RC) 
LOGIN AND AUHTHENTICATION 
PHASE: 
 3.  Check |Tc-T2| <= ΔT, 
n2=M4  h(n1 || PWDi  || Hi), 
M5 ?=h(IDi || n1 || n2 || K || T2), 
SKij = h(n1 || n2 || K || Hi), 
M6 = h(SKij || IDi || n2 || T3) 
 
 
h(Ri || Ti  ||Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj)) 
?=Mij 
SK=h(Ri || Ni || Nj || Vi) 
Mij' = h(SK || Ri || Nj || Vi || SIDj)  
 
PIDi' =Ti h(PIDi || Vi || Ri) 
Replac  PIDi with PIDi' in SC 
 
m3 = {M6, T3} 
Check |Tc-T3| <= ΔT, 
M6 ?= h(SKij || IDi || n2 || T3) 
 
m2 = {M4, M5, T2} 
1. Selects IDi, PWi,  
PWDi=h (PWi||H(Bi)) 
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for Ii update for not having the knowledge of 
h(x||y). This proof nullifies the author’s claim of 
modifying the password without RC’s engagement. 
 
3.2 Moon et al. scheme 
The Moon et al. scheme presents an improved 
biometric multi-server authentication protocol 
after finding attacks in Lu et al. [46]. This 
section presents the design and limitations in 
Moon et al. scheme [25] as depicted below: 
3.2.1   Protocol design of Moon et al.  
In Moon et al., the RC registers Sj by sending 
secret parameter PSK and secret number x using 
a confidential channel. The scheme comprises 
two phases notably, Registration and Login & 
Authentication phase, as depicted in figure 3.   
a) The Registration procedure 
The user enrolls with RC for registration to 
perform the under-mentioned steps: 
1. Ui selects IDi, PWi, and calculates 
PWDi=h(PWi||H(Bi)). Then, it submits the 
request {IDi, PWDi} towards RC.  
2. RC, after receiving {IDi, PWDi}, generates yi 
and computes Gi = h(IDi || PWDi), Pi = h(yi 
|| PSK)  IDi, Hi = h(IDi ||x  and Ai = yi   
h(PSK), Then, it stores Gi, Pi, Hi, Ai in smart 
card. Next, it forwards the updated smart card 
towards Ui. 
 
b) Login and Authentication procedure 
1. In this phase the user initiates the procedure 
for having authenticated access from Sj 
directly. To serve the purpose, the Ui 
proceeds to input its IDi, PWi and imprint 
biometric Bi. Next, the smart card computes 
PWDi*=h (PWi||H(Bi)) and checks the 
equation Vi ?= h(IDi || PWDi*). If it holds 
true, then further constructs K= h((Pi 
IDi)|| SIDj) and defines a random integer as 
n1, and further computes M1= KIDi, M2= 
n1  K, M3=K  PWDi and Mi= h(Hi || n1 || 
PWDi || T1). Next, it submits the message {Ai, 
Mi, M1, M3, M2, T1 } towards Sj. 
2. Sj receives the request and checks |Tc-T1| 
<= ΔT. If the difference is less than threshold, 
it further computes yi=Ai   h(PSK), K=h(h(yi 
|| PSK ) || SIDj), n1= M2  K, IDi = M1  K 
and PWDi =M3   K, Hi = h(IDi || x). Next, it 
verifies the equality for Mi ?= h(Hi || n1 || 
PWDi || T1). If true, then it validates the user, 
and further generates n2, and computes 
M4=n2  h(n1 || PWDi || Hi) , M5=h(IDi || 
n1 || n2 || K || T2) and SKij = h(n1 || n2 || K || 
Hi). Next, it sends the message {M4, M5, T2} 
towards Ui. 
3. Next, the Ui receives the message {M4, M5, 
T2} and matches the timestamp difference 
against threshold. If it is valid, then it 
computes n2=M4  h(n1 || PWDi || Hi), and 
verifies M5 ?=h(IDi || n1 || n2 || K || T2). It 
validates Sj on the positive match. Next, it 
computes SKij = h(n1 || n2 || K || Hi), and M6 
= h(SKij || IDi || n2 || T3). Finally it sends M6 
towards Sj for further verification. 
4. Sj receives the message and matches the 
timestamp with threshold. If it holds true, 
further computes and verifies the equality M6 
?= h(SKij || IDi || n2 || T3) to finally validate 
the user. 
 
3.2.2      Weaknesses in Moon et al. 
 
The Moon et al.’s protocol has been discovered 
as susceptible to identity guessing attack, and 
once identity is guessed, the user becomes 
vulnerable to many sorts of other attacks, e.g., 
impersonation attack and session keys guessing 
attack. 
 
a)  Stolen smart card leading to Identity guessing 
Attack 
The identity IDi of a user, being a low entropy 
string just like a low entropy password, can be 
guessed in polynomial amount of time by 
adopting the following procedure. 
1. An adversary may extract the contents {Gi, 
Pi, Hi, Ai, h()} of a stolen smart card by 
using differential power analysis [54]. At 
the same time it may also intercept the 
messages M1, M2 and M3, i.e  M1= K  IDi, 
M2= n1  K, M3=K  PWDi. Next, it may 
attempt many combinations of the selected 
IDi* and compute the following parameters. 
K* = M1  IDi*   (1) 
n1*= M2  K*   (2) 
   PWDi* =K*  M3   (3) 
     h(Hi || n1* || PWDi* || T1)  ?= Mi    (4) 
The adversary keeps checking different 
combinations of IDi* until the equation (4) holds. 
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Once a valid IDi string is guessed, it might easily 
compute other parameters as well, i.e. K, n1 and 
PWDi. After guessing these parameters, an 
adversary might be in a strong position to launch 
user impersonation attack, Key-Compromise 
Impersonation attack (server masquerading attack), 
and may even recover all previous session keys as 
elaborated below. 
 
b) User impersonation attack 
In case, an adversary accesses the IDi, PWDi, Hi 
and K parameters as described above, it may 
launch user impersonation attack by constructing a 
new authentication request message m1= {Ai, Mi, 
M1, M2, M3, T1 } by generating a novel random 
secret na and computing M1= K  IDi, M2= na   
K, M3=K  PWDi and Mi= h(Hi || na || PWDi || 
T1). Next, it submits the message {Ai, Mi, M1, M3, 
M2, T1} towards Sj. Following all the steps as 
defined in sub-section 3.2.1(b), it may construct the 
final verification message {M6} and send towards 
Sj impersonating Ui, which will be verified by Sj 
successfully, however fake. 
 
c) Key-Compromise Impersonation attack 
An adversary, after guessing and accessing the 
parameters {IDi, PWDi, Hi , K} may construct the 
message m2 = {M4, M5, T2}, whereas M4= nb   
h(n1 || PWDi || Hi), M5=h(IDi || n1 || nb || K || 
T2), nb is fresh random number and T2 is new 
timestamp. After constructing the message, it may 
forward to the legitimate user impersonating as a 
server and will be successfully verified by the user, 
however fake. 
 
d) Session key security failure 
After guessing and computing the parameters {IDi, 
PWDi, Hi, K}, an adversary may compute past 
session keys SKij by capturing the earlier messages 
and computing n1 and n2, i.e. 
 
       n1 = M2 K          (5) 
n2 = M4  h(n1 || PWDi || Hi)        (6) 
In this way, it may construct all previous session 
keys by computing SKij = h(n1 || n2 || K || Hi). 
Hence, the Moon et al.’s protocol is prone to 
session key security attack. 
 
3.3  Wang et al. protocol  
 
The Wang et al. depicts an improved biometric 
multi-server authentication protocol after 
finding drawbacks in Mishra et al. [47]. This 
section presents the design and limitations of 
Wang et al. protocol as illustrated below:  
 
3.3.1    Protocol design of Wang et al.  
The Wang et al. protocol is composed of two 
phases, i.e. Registration and Login & 
authentication phase, as depicted in Figure 4. 
The server gets registered through RC using a 
shared secret PSK on a secure channel. 
 
a) The Registration Phase  
In registration phase, the user performs 
registration procedure with RC by adopting the 
following steps: 
1. The Ui inputs its identity IDi, password PWi, 
imprints Bi. Thereafter, it calculates Gen 
(Bi)→ (Ri, Pi), RPBi =h(PWi || Ri) and submits 
{IDi, RPWi } to RC on a secure channel. 
2. RC, initially stores <IDi, Ni =1> in its 
credential table for maintaining the status 
of non-revoked subscriber, which may be 
updated to <IDi, Ni =0>, whenever Ui wants 
to revoke its registration in future. Next, RC 
calculates Wi = h(IDi ||x||Tr), Xi = RPBi  
h(Wi), Yi = Xi  h(PSK), Zi = PSK  Wi  
h(PSK), and Qi = h(IDi || RPBi), while Tr 
represents registration time. Finally, RC stores 
Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi in SC, and forwards to user by 
using a confidential channel. Where PSK is a 
shared secret among RC and all servers. 
3. The user receives smart card and stores Pi 
in it finally.  
 
b)  Login & Authentication Phase 
1. In this phase, the user seeks verified access 
of servers directly without RC. To meet the 
objective, Ui enters its identity IDi, 
password PWi, then it imprints Bi to 
compute Rep(Bi, Pi)→(Ri). Then, it constructs 
RPBi =h(PWi||Ri) and verifies the equality 
h(IDi || RPBi) ?= Qi. If it holds true, then it 
further computes h(PSK)= Xi   Yi, generates 
a random number r1, and computes CIDi = 
IDi  h(r1), M1= RPBi  r1  h(PSK) and 
M2= h(CIDi || r1 || RPBi || SIDj || Ti). Finally, 
it sends the message m1= { CIDi, M1, M2, Xi, 
Zi, Ti } using insecure channel towards Sj for 
verification. 
 9 
2. Sj, after receiving the message, checks the 
difference of timestamps against the threshold 
by comparing Ti –Tj <= ΔT. If true, then it 
further computes  Wi = PSK Zi  h(PSK), 
RPBi =Xi  h(Wi), r1=RPBi  M1  h(PSK) 
and verifies the equality for h(CIDi || r1 || 
RPBi || SIDj || Ti) ?= M2. If it holds true, then 
it generates r2 and computes SKij =h(CIDi || 
SIDj || r1 || r2), M3 = r2  h(CIDi || r1)  
h(PSK) and M4=h(SIDj || r2 || CIDi). Next, it 
submits {SIDj, M4, M3} using insecure 
channel. 
3. After receiving the message, the user 
computes r2= M3   h(CIDi || r1)  h(PSK), 
SKij =h(CIDi || SIDj || r1 || r2), r1=Xi  M1 
 h(PSK). Then, it matches equality for 
h(SIDj || r2 || CIDi ) ?=M4. If does not match, 
it aborts the session. Otherwise, it further 
computes M5 = h(SKij || r1 || r2) and sends 
the message m3 = {M5} towards Sj for 
verification. 
4. Sj receives the message M5, and computes and 
verifies the equality for equation M5 ?= h(SKij 
|| r1 || r2). If it is true, it validates the user as a 
legitimate subscriber, and establishes the 
session key SKij =h(CIDi || SIDj || r1 || r2) 
with it. 
 
 10 
 
Figure 4. Wang et al. registration and login & authentication phase 
3.3.2     Weaknesses in Wang et al. scheme. 
 
The Wang et al. protocol has been found 
susceptible to trace attack, session specific 
temporary information attack, Key-Compromise 
Impersonation attack and insider attack. The 
details of the attacks are described below. 
a)  Trace Attack 
An adversary may distinguish a particular user 
among other users, and identify its location on the 
SC { Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi, h()} 
{IDi, RPBi } 
Stores for revocation <IDi, Ni =1>, 
Wi= h(IDi  || x || Tr), 
Xi= RPBi  h(Wi), 
Yi= Xi  h(PSK), 
Zi= PSK  Wi  h(PSK), 
Qi= h(IDi || RPBi), 
Stores Xi, Yi, Zi, Qi in Smart card 
1. The user inputs IDi, PWi, and imprints Bi 
Rep (Bi, Pi)→ (Ri) 
Computes RPBi =h(PWi || Ri), 
Qi=h(IDi || RPBi), h(PSK)= Xi   Yi, 
generates r1 
CIDi = IDi  h(r1), 
M1= RPBi  r1  h(PSK), 
M2= h(CIDi || r1 || RPBi || SIDj || Ti) 
REGISTRATION PHASE: 
m1= { CIDi, M1, M2, Xi, Zi, Ti } 
2.  Ti –Tj <= ΔT, 
Retrieves Wi = PSK Zi  h(PSK), 
RPBi =Xi  h(Wi) 
r1=RPBi  M1  h(PSK) 
h(CIDi || r1 || RPBi || SIDj || Ti) ?= M2 
Generates r2 
SKij =h(CIDi || SIDj || r1 || r2) 
M3 = r2  h(CIDi || r1)  h(PSK) 
M4=h(SIDj || r2 || CIDi) 
5.Ui  receives the SC and  
stores Pi additionally. 
User (Ui) Server (Sj) 
User (Ui) Registration Centre (RC) 
LOGIN AND AUHTHENTICATION 
PHASE: 
 
3.   r2= M3   h(CIDi || r1)  h(PSK), 
      SKij =h(CIDi || SIDj || r1 || r2) 
     r1=Xi  M1  h(PSK), 
     h(SIDj || r2 || CIDi ) =M4 
     M5 = h(SKij || r1 || r2) 
 
 
h(Ri || Ti  ||Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj)) ?=Mij 
SK=h(Ri || Ni || Nj || Vi) 
Mij' = h(SK || Ri || Nj || Vi || SIDj)  
 
PIDi' =Ti h(PIDi || Vi || Ri) 
Replace PIDi with PIDi' in SC 
 
m3 = {M5} 
4.      M5 ?= h(SKij || r1 || r2) 
 
m2 = {SIDj, M3, M4} 
1. Selects IDi, PWi, Imprints Bi, 
Gen (Bi)→ (Ri, Pi) 
Selects IDi, PWi 
Computes RPBi =h(PWi || Ri) 
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basis of intercepted public parameters {Xi, Zi} 
which remains uniform in all authentication 
requests. Since, all authentication requests of a 
particular user at different locations are bound to 
contain the parameters {Xi, Zi}, the locations can be 
linked and traced with the occurrence of common 
parameters by the adversary. If an adversary is 
privileged insider, having the values IDi and RPBi, 
it may easily compute CIDi, M1 and M2. In this 
manner, it may comfortably trace the linkages 
between IDi and locations, where the 
authentication requests were originated.  
 
b)  Session-specific temporary information 
Attack 
In Wang et al. protocol, if a single session-specific 
temporary random number is accidentally exposed, 
then the adversary may recover not only current 
session key but all previous session keys in the 
following ways. 
 
i. Exposure of current session key 
If a single session-specific temporary random 
number r1 is exposed, then a malicious insider 
(adversary) having access to h(PSK) may compute 
the current session by adopting the following steps. 
• The adversary computes r2 = M3   
h(CIDi || r1)  h(PSK), assuming the 
adversary intercepts the parameter CIDi for 
the current session. 
• Next, the current session key may be 
constructed by computing SKij =h(CIDi || 
SIDj || r1 || r2). 
 
ii. Exposure of previous session keys 
Once, r1 is exposed, then the adversary having 
access to h(PSK) may recover all previous session 
keys by adopting the following steps. 
 
• It computes RPBi = M1 r1  h(PSK) out 
of a disclosed single session-specific 
variable r1. 
• Next, it may compute other session-specific 
numbers r1j and r2j, while j = 1…..n. 
(where n represents the number of sessions 
up to which the adversary could recover the 
variables and had intercepted the 
messages), for instance, 
 
r1j = RPBi  M1  h(PSK)    (7) 
 
r2j = M3  h(CIDi ||r1j) h(PSK)     (8) 
 
• Next, it may compute the session key of 
corresponding computed parameters, r1j  
and r2j, i.e. 
 
SKij =h(CIDi || SIDj || r1j || r2j)  (9) 
 
 
c)  Key-Compromise Information Attack (KCI) 
 
In Wang et al. protocol, an adversary on the 
compromise of a single session-specific random 
number once, may launch KCI attack and 
masquerade as a server by adopting the following 
steps. 
 
1. According to sub-section 3.2.2 (b), on the 
compromise of r1 random integer, the 
malicious insider may compute RPBi. Next it 
may compute r1j from another intercepted 
user’s authentication request message M1, i.e. 
 
   r1j = RPBi  M1  h(PSK) (10) 
 
2. Then, it further computes M3 = r2  h(CIDi 
|| r1j)  h(PSK) and M4=h(SIDj||r2|| CIDi), 
while r2 is a fresh random integer. Next, it 
sends the message m2={SIDj, M3, M4} 
towards Ui to masquerade as a server Sj. 
3. That fake message will be successfully 
verified by the user, and the later will be 
treating the adversary as a valid server. 
 
d) Insider attack, leading to session keys 
exposure 
An insider, having the RPBi parameter which 
might be acquired during user registration 
procedure, may compute all previous session keys 
for that user, of which RPBi is recovered, by 
adopting the following procedure. 
1. Since, the parameter h(PSK) is known to every 
user, hence any compromised user may 
disclose that parameter, which may be 
approached by an adversary. Further, the 
adversary may compute r1 = RPBi  M1 
h(PSK) and r2 = M3   h(CIDi || r1)  
h(PSK) . 
2. Ultimately, it may construct the corresponding 
session key by computing SKij =h(CIDi || 
SIDj || r1 || r2). 
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4.  PROPOSED MODEL 
 
The multi-server environment comprises three 
participating entities, i.e. user (Ui), server (Sj), and 
the registration centre (RC). RC defines two secrets; 
one is master secret x and another simple secret y. 
Next, it computes h(x||y) and shares with all the 
legal service providers Sj, using a confidential 
channel. Some symbols that describe the proposed 
model are depicted in Table I. 
 
Table I: Description of notations  
 
The proposed model comprises three stages, i.e., 
user registration, login & authentication, and 
password update phase as described under: 
 
4.1 The Registration Phase 
In registration phase the user performs the 
under-mentioned steps with registration centre 
as following: 
1. First, the user inputs the parameters IDi, BIOi, 
PWi, and generates random numbers r1 and r2. 
It then, computes Y= h(H(BIOi) ||IDi || r2), 
TPW=h(PWi ||H(BIOi)), and sends {IDi, 
Y,TPW r1 } to registration centre for 
registration. 
2. Then, RC constructs A= h(IDi || x), Vi = h(A || 
h(x || y)) , W'= TPW  r1 Vi , Di'=A h(IDi 
||Y) and Fi = h(h(IDi ||Y)). Further, it 
generates a random integer t and constructs 
PIDi =E h(x || y) (A || h(t)). Next, RC stores in 
smart card {PIDi , Di', Fi, W', h()} and submits 
to Ui. 
3.  Ui receives the SC and computes W= W' r1, 
Di=Di'  h(IDi ||r2 ) and Br= H(BIOi)  r2 . 
Then, it replaces W' with W, Di' with Di, and 
stores Br in SC finally. The smart card now 
contains {PIDi , Di, Fi, W, Br , h()}. 
 
4.2 Login & Authentication Phase 
 
1. In this phase, the user seeks authorized 
access to services from Sj through RC. To 
meet this objective, Ui inputs IDi, BIOi, PWi. 
Next, the smart card calculates Y = h 
(H(BIOi) ||IDi || r2) after extracting r2 from Br, 
and compares Fi* ?= h(h(IDi ||Y)). If it holds 
true, then further computes TPW=h(PWi || 
H(BIOi)), Vi =TPW W and A= Di  h(IDi || 
r2 ) h(IDi ||Y). Then, it generates a random 
number Ni, and computes ZIDi = h(PIDi || Vi 
|| A || Ni). Next, it sends the message 
m1={PIDi, ZIDi, Ni} to Sj for verification.  
2. RC receives the request m1= { PIDi, ZIDi, Ni } 
and computes (A || h(t))= Dh(x || y)(PIDi), Vi = 
h( A || h(x || y)) and compares ZIDi  ?= h(PIDi 
|| Vi || A || Ni). If the equation holds true, it 
generates random integer t' and Nj. Then, it 
calculates PIDi' =Eh(x || y) (A || h(t')), Ti = PIDi' 
 h(PIDi || A || Vi) and Mij = h(A|| Ti || Ni 
||Nj|| Vi || SIDj). Finally, it submits the 
message m2 = {Mij, Ti, Nj} to Ui. 
3. After getting m2, Ui calculates h(A || Ti || Ni || 
Nj || Vi || SIDj)) and compares Mij. If it holds 
true, then further computes SKij= h(A|| Ni || Nj 
|| Vi || SIDj), Mij' = h(SKij || A || Nj || Vi || 
SIDj) and sends the message m3 = {Mij'} to Sj 
for final verification with Nj based challenge.. 
Besides, it also computes PIDi' =Ti  h(PIDi 
|| A || Vi) and replace PID with PIDi' in its 
smart card. 
4. The Sj receives m3 and computes SKij= h(A|| 
Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj). Then, it checks the 
equality h(SKij || A || Nj || Vi || SIDj) ?= Mij'. 
If the above verification holds true, it 
establishes the session key with Ui as h(A|| Ni 
|| Nj || Vi || SIDj). We have highlighted some 
salient differences of our proposed scheme in 
Figure 5. 
 
4.3  Password modification  
 
The user updates its password by invoking this 
procedure, into fresh password PWinew without 
seeking any help from RC. Its steps are given 
below: 
 
1. The user puts its smart card into the SC reader 
and also inputs identity IDi* along with 
password PWi*. Then, it imprints the 
biometric identity BIOi* into the scanner.  
Thereafter, the smart card calculates 
Y=h(H( BIOi)||IDi||r2) after extracting r2, and
Notations Description 
Ui ith User  
IDi/PWDi  User’s identity and password 
Sj,  SIDj Server, Server’s identity 
RC Registration centre 
x , y RC’s master key and secret key 
H(.) Bio-hashing function 
h(.)  a secure hash digest function 
Ek()/Dk():  Symmetric encryption/decryption 
SKij Session Key shared between Ui 
and Sj 
||/: Concatenation, XOR function 
 13 
 
Figure 5.  Proposed model (Registration, and Login & authentication) 
 {PIDi , Di', Fi,  W', h()} 
{IDi, Y, TPW  r1} 
1. The user inputs IDi, PWi, and imprints BIOi in SC Then 
computes Y = h (H(BIOi) ||IDi || r2) after extracting r2  from Br 
 
Checks Fi* ?= h(h(IDi ||Y)) 
Generates Ni  
Computes TPW=h(PWi || H(BIOi)), 
Vi =TPW W, 
A= Di  h(IDi||r2 )  h(IDi ||Y), 
ZIDi = h(PIDi || Vi || A || Ni) 
 
REGISTRATION PHASE: 
m1= { PIDi, ZIDi, Ni } 
2.  (A || h(t))= Dh(x || y)(PIDi), 
Vi = h(A || h(x || y)) 
ZIDi  ?= h(PIDi || Vi ||A|| Ni) 
Generates t', Nj 
PIDi' =E h(x || y) (A || h(t')), 
Ti = PIDi'  h(PIDi || A|| Vi), 
Mij = h(A|| Ti || Ni ||Nj || Vi || SIDj) 
 
3. Ui  computes W= W' r1, Di=Di'  
h(IDi ||r2 ) , Br= H(BIOi)  r2  and 
replaces W' with W, Di' with Di, stores Br 
in SC now containing {PIDi , Di, Fi,  W, 
Br , h()} 
 
User (Ui) Server (Sj) 
User (Ui) Registration Centre (RC) 
LOGIN AND AUHTHENTICATION 
PHASE: 
3. h( A || Ti  ||Ni ||Nj|| Vi || SIDj)) ?=Mij 
SKij= h(A || Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj), 
Mij' = h(SKij || A || Nj || Vi || SIDj)  
 
 
m3 = {Mij'} 4.   Check 
SKij= h(A || Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj), 
h(SKij || A || Nj || Vi || SIDj) ?=   Mij' 
 
m2 = {Mij, Ti, Nj} 
Imprints BIOi, Computes 
TPW=h(PWi || H(BIOi)), 
Y=h(H(BIOi) ||IDi || r2) 
Shared session key =SKij= h(A || Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj) 
 
1.   Selects IDi, PWi, r1, r2, 
2. A= h(IDi || x) 
Vi = h(A || h(x || y)) 
W'= TPW  r1 Vi 
Generate random number t 
PIDi =E h(x || y) (A || h(t)),  
Di'=A h(IDi ||Y) 
Fi = h(h(IDi ||Y)) 
PIDi' =Ti h(PIDi || A|| Vi) 
Replace PIDi with PIDi' in SC 
Secure channel 
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compares Fi* ?= h(h(IDi ||Y)). If true, then 
moves to the next step. 
2. The SC, then computes TPW=h(PWi || 
H(BIOi)) and Vi = TPW  W . 
3. Next, the Ui inputs a new password PWinew and 
the SC further computes TPWnew=h(PWinew || 
H(BIOi)), Wnew = Vi  TPWnew. 
4. Next, the value W is replaced with Wnew in the 
smart card. 
 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
This section comprises automated security 
verification using ProVerif tool [55] and security 
analysis using BAN logic [47-48] as following. 
 
5.1 Automated Security Verification 
 
The objective of any automated security 
verification tool is to analyze the strength of an 
authentication protocol for any threat. ProVerif 
[52] is deemed to be as one of the powerful tools 
by the academia to judge the reliability of 
authentication schemes’ robustness against threats. 
ProVerif works on widely familiar applied 𝜋 
calculus which supports a great deal with different 
cryptographic primitives like encryption/ 
decryption, digital signatures, one-way hash-based 
and Diffie-Helman-based operations etc. In order to 
test the efficacy of our scheme, we have analyzed 
and tested the results of the protocol in ProVerif 
automated tool.  
    We begin the tool testing process, first, by 
defining the two channels used among the Ui, Sj 
and RC entities as, a private channel SCh and a 
public channel PCh. 
 
(*** Channels ***) 
free SCh: channel [private].  (*Confidential Channel*) 
free PCh: channel.  (*Open/insecure Channel*) 
 
The constants and variables as used in the proposed 
scheme are given as follows. 
 
(*** Constants and Variables ***) 
free IDi : bitstring. 
free SIDj : bitstring. 
free x : bitstring [ private ] . 
free y : bitstring [ private ] . 
 
The constructors H, h, XOR and CONCAT are 
defined as Bio-hashing, one-way hash functions, 
exclusive or and concatenation, respectively. We 
define an equation (XOR) to utilize the property of 
exclusive or, i.e. XOR(XOR(u,v),v) = u. The 
security primitives, i.e. constructors, destructors, 
and equations for the proposed scheme have been 
modeled in ProVerif as follows. 
 
(*** Constructor ***) 
fun h(bitstring ) :bitstring . 
fun H(bitstring ) :bitstring . 
fun XOR(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring. 
fun ENC(bitstring, bitstring): bitstring. 
fun CONCAT( bitstring ,bitstring):bitstring . 
 
 
(** Destructors & related Equations **) 
equation forall u: bitstring, v: bitstring; XOR (XOR(u,v) ,v)=u. 
reduc forall w: bitstring, key: bitstring; DEC (ENC (w, Pub), 
Prs)=w. 
 
We have modeled two events for each of the 
entities (Ui and Sj). The start and end events for Ui 
are beginUserUi(bitstring) and 
endUserUi(bitstring), while the same events for Sj 
are beginServerSj (bitstring) and 
endServerSj(bitstring). The authenticity of our 
protocol can be verified by checking the associated 
relationship between either of the participant’s 
beginning and ending events. These events are 
described as follows. 
 
(** Events **) 
event beginUserUi ( bitstring ) . 
event endUserUi ( bitstring ) . 
event beginServerSj ( bitstring ) . 
event endServerSj ( bitstring ) . 
 
We have defined three distinct processes UserUi, 
RegistrationCentreRC, and ServerSj to model the 
three entities i.e. Ui, RC and Sj, respectively. The 
process UserUi initially sends the computed 
parameters (IDi, Y, TPW’) using secure channel 
SCh towards ServerSj. Likewise, after receiving the 
(xPIDi, xDi’, xFi, xW’) message, the UserUi 
process further computes W, Di and Br, and stores 
all parameters in smart card. In mutual 
authentication phase, the UserUi process compares 
xFi and Fi’ after computing Fi’. If it holds true, it 
further computes TPW, Vi, A, ZIDi. Next, using 
PCh, it sends (xPIDi, ZIDi, Ni) towards ServerSj 
process. Afterwards, the same process, UserUi 
receives (xMij, xTi, xNj) and computes xMij’ and 
compares with xMij. If both parameters are 
equivalent, then computes SKij, Mij’ and sends 
Mij’ towards ServerSj process. Next, it recovers 
PIDi’ and replaces with PIDi in smart card. 
 
 
 (*********************** p r o c e s s e s 
**********************) 
( ***************** User Ui **************** ) 
let UserUi= 
( ****** Registration * ) 
new r1: bitstring; 
new r2: bitstring; 
let TPW= h(CONCAT(PWi, H(BIOi)), b) in 
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let TPW’=XOR(TPW, r1) in 
let Y=h(CONCAT(H(BIOi), IDi, r2)) in 
out (SCh , (IDi, Y, TPW’)) ; 
in (SCh, (xPIDi : bitstring, xDi’:bitstring, xFi:bitstring , 
xW’:bitstring,)) ; 
let W=XOR(xW’, r1) in 
let Di=XOR(xDi’, h(CONCAT(IDi, r2))) in 
let Br=XOR(H(BIOi), r2) in 
 
( ******** Login and Authentication * ) 
event beginUserUi ( IDi ) ; 
let r2= XOR(Br, H(BIOi)) in 
let Y=h(CONCAT(H(BIOi), IDi, r2)) in 
let Fi’=h(h(CONCAT(IDi, Y))) in 
if (xFi=Fi’) then 
new Ni:bitstring; 
let TPW= h(CONCAT(PWi, H(BIOi)), b) in 
let Vi= XOR(TPW, W) in 
let A=XOR(Di, h(CONCAT(IDi, r2)), h(CONCAT(IDi, 
Y))) in 
let ZIDi = h(CONCAT(xPIDi, Vi, A, Ni)) in 
out (PCh, (xPIDi, ZIDi, Ni)) ; 
in (PCh, (xMij : bitstring, xTi:bitstring, xNj:bitstring)) ; 
let xMij’=h(CONCAT(A, xTi, Ni, xNj, Vi, SIDj)) in 
if (xMij’ = xMij) then 
let SKij= h(CONCAT(A, Ni, xNj, Vi, SIDj)) in 
         let Mij’=h(CONCAT(SKij, A, xNj, Vi, SIDj)) in 
let PIDi’=XOR(xTi, h(CONCAT(xPIDi, A, Vi))) in 
let PIDi = PIDi’ in 
out (PCh, (Mij’)) ; 
event endUserUi (IDi) 
else 
0. 
 
The RegistrationCentreRC process receives 
the parameters (xIDi, xY, xTPW’) from 
UserUi process on a secure channel SCh, 
computes A and Vi, and sends the tuple (Wi’, 
PIDi, Di’, Fi) towards UserUi using SCh 
channel. Likewise, for registering server it 
computes XY= h(CONCAT(x, y)) in, and 
sends to any new process ServerSj to complete 
the registration process. 
 
(******************* Registration Centre (RC) 
*******************) 
let RegistrationCentreRC = 
( ******* User Registration * ) 
in (SCh , xIDi : bitstring, xY: bitstring, xTPW’: bitstring ) ; 
let A=h(CONCAT(IDi, x)) in 
let Vi=h(CONCAT(A, XY)) in 
let W’=XOR(TPW’, Vi) in 
new t : bitstring ; 
let PIDi = ENC(CONCAT(A, h(t)), XY) in 
let Di’ = XOR(CONCAT(A, h(CONCAT(IDi, Y))) in 
let Fi = h(h(CONCAT(IDi, Y))) in 
out (SCh, (PIDi , Di’, Fi, W’)) ; 
( ******* Server Registration * ) 
let XY = h(CONCAT(x, y)) in 
out (SCh , ( XY )) ; 
0 . 
The ServerSj process receives the parameter xXY 
during server registration process. During mutual 
authentication phase, the ServerSj process receives 
the tuple (xxPIDi, xZIDi, xNi) from UserUi 
process and computes A, Vi and ZIDi for 
comparing ZIDi with xZIDi. If it holds true, it 
further generates t’ and computes PIDi’, Ti and 
Mij. Then, it sends the tuple (Mij, Ti, Nj) using 
public channel towards UserUi. The same process, 
after receiving xMij’, computes SKij, Mij’’ and 
compares xMij’ against Mij’’. If it holds true, then 
it validates the UserUi as a valid process and the 
developed session key SKij, and proceeds for 
verifying the message authenticity on its end.  
 
(******************* Server (Sj) *******************) 
( * Server Sj * ) 
let ServerSj= 
( ********* Registration * ) 
in (SCh , ( xXY : bitstring )) ; 
 
( ********** Login and Authentication * ) 
event beginServerSj ( SIDj ) ; 
in (PCh, (xxPIDi, xZIDi, xNi)) ; 
let A = DEC( xxPIDi ,xXY) in 
let Vi = h(CONCAT(A, xXY)) in     
let ZIDi’=h(CONCAT(xxPIDi, Vi, A, xNi)) in 
if (ZIDi’ = xZIDi) then 
new t’ : bitstring ; 
new Nj : bitstring ; 
let PIDi’ = ENC(CONCAT(A, h(t’)), xXY) in 
let Ti=XOR(PID’, h(CONCAT(xxPIDi, A, Vi)) in 
let Mij=h(CONCAT(A, Ti, xNi, Nj, Vi, SIDj)) in 
out (PCh, (Mij, Ti, Nj)) ; 
in (PCh,(xMij’: bitstring)) ; 
let SKij = h(CONCAT(A, xNi, Nj, Vi, SIDj)) in 
let Mij’’=h(CONCAT(SKij, A, Nj, Vi, SIDj)) in 
if (Mij’’ = xMij’) then 
event endServerSj ( SIDj ) 
else 
0 . 
 
The three principals or participants are agreed 
for an unbounded number of parallel sessions, 
hence the three processes are deemed to be in 
replication as shown below. 
 
 process  
 ( ( ! UserUi ) | ( ! RegistrationCentreRC) | ( ! ServerSj ) ) 
 
We define the under mentioned queries for 
testing the security and correctness of the 
proposed protocol. 
(**  Queries **) 
free SK: bitstring [ private ] . 
query attacker (SK) . 
query id : bitstring ; inj event ( endUserUi ( id )) ==> inj 
event ( beginUserUi ( id )) . 
query id : bitstring ; inj event ( endServerSj ( id ) ) ==> inj 
event ( beginServerSj ( id )) . 
The following three results have been obtained 
after the implementation of above mentioned 
queries in this simulation. 
 
RESULT inj-event(endServerSj(id)) ==> inj-
event(beginServerSj(id)) is true. 
RESULT inj-event(endUserUi(id_1890)) ==> inj-
event(beginUserUi(id_1890)) is true. 
RESULT not attacker (SK[]) is true. 
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The computed results (1) and (2) indicate clearly 
that all of the three processes started and ended 
successfully, while the result (3) verifies that the 
adversary’s query failed to expose the session key 
generated by the processes during the 
authentication phase.  
 
5.2  Informal security discussion  
The security analysis of proposed scheme is 
described below: 
 
5.2.1 Replay Attacks 
An adversary Ӑ, having access to intercepted 
parameters {PIDi, ZIDi, Ni, Mij, Ti, Nj, Mij'} might 
attempt to replay the message to deceive any legal 
user or server. However, the use of newly created 
session parameters by the legal participants like Ni 
and Nj, each time a session is established, debars Ӑ 
to launch a replay attack. If an attacker replays the 
message m1= {PIDi, ZIDi, Ni} towards Sj, the later 
verifies the authenticity of Ui in the m3 message 
received in the last, in response to the Nj based 
challenge. i.e. if there is Nj in m3 along with other 
parameters, it validates the user. At the same time, 
the Ui confirms the authenticity of Sj in the m2 
message, in response to the Ni based challenge in 
m1. i.e. if there is Ni in m2 along with other 
parameters, it validates the server. Hence, the 
proposed scheme could foil a replay attack 
successfully. 
 
5.2.2 Modification Attacks 
 
If an adversary attempts to modify the intercepted 
messages {PIDi, ZIDi, Ni, Mij, Ti, Nj, Mij'}, it may 
not be able to construct the parameters {ZIDi, Gij, 
Mij, Mij'} by generating novel session variables, in 
view of the fact that the construction of these 
messages require the knowledge of Vi and A. 
While, these parameters are only known to the 
legitimate participants, and the later can easily 
detect any malicious participant. Therefore, Ӑ may 
not be able to launch modification attack. Hence, 
the proposed scheme could foil a modification 
attack successfully. 
 
5.2.3 Offline-password guessing Attack 
 
This attack can be initiated when an attacker 
attempts to obtain a Ui’s password on account of 
publicly available parameters [44-46]. In proposed 
scheme, an adversary may intercept the messages 
and access the parameters {PIDi, ZIDi, Ni, Mij, Ti, 
Nj, Mij'} after careful observation of public 
channel. Nonetheless, the adversary may not be 
able to recover the PWi, since PWi is not used in 
any transcript that could offer the adversary any 
chance to guess Ui’s password. Likewise, using 
stolen smart card contents {PIDi, Di, Fi, Br , W, 
h()} , the adversary needs H(BIOi) and Vi 
parameters to guess PWi from W.  Hence, the 
offline guessing attack using smart card cannot be 
initiated in polynomial time in proposed scheme. 
 
5.2.4 Stolen Verifier Attacks 
 
An attacker might get some precious information 
that is stored on server’s end; and if it also 
maintains the database of Ui’s information like 
passwords or other shared secrets, and utilize it to 
impersonate as the legal users, this is termed as 
stolen verifier attack [41-43]. 
The proposed scheme does not keep any storage 
database on the part of Sj or RC that is an essential 
requirement for an attacker to launch such an 
attack.  
 
5.2.5 Stolen Smart Card attack 
 
As we see in sub-section 5.3, that an attacker can 
never extract password using stolen smart card 
contents in polynomial time. In view of this fact, 
the attacker might not be able to construct an up-to-
date ZIDi parameter for authentication request 
message except replaying it, which is detected by 
the server in the third run. Therefore, the adversary 
evidently cannot initiate any sort of impersonation 
or masquerading attack. Hence, the stolen smart 
card contents do not lead to other attacks in our 
scheme.   
 
5.2.6 Session Key Security 
 
In proposed scheme, for constructing a valid 
session key SK= h(A|| Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj), an 
adversary needs to access A and Vi. Even, if the IDi 
of the user is exposed, still an adversary may not 
construct the parameter A=h(IDi || x) that prevents 
Ӑ from generating SK, unlike Chen and Lee and 
Moon et al. schemes. Furthermore, Ӑ also needs Vi 
to construct SK, however, an adversary cannot 
derive or construct Vi without the knowledge of 
h(x||y), TPW or H(BIOi) parameters. Hence, there 
are little chances for an adversary to generate a 
valid session key by any of the means.  
 
5.2.7 Known-Key Security 
 
The known-key security maintains the security of 
private keys or secrets of involved participants in a 
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session, once the session key is compromised [36-
40]. Since, the session key SK= h(A || Ni || Nj || Vi 
|| SIDj) is not a function of Ui’s password PWi. 
Although, it contains the parameter A, but Ӑ cannot 
guess x: RC’s private key, out of it as being a large 
bit random integer. Hence, an adversary cannot 
guess the secrets out of any session key revealed. 
Therefore, the proposed scheme has been quite 
secure for the known-key security. 
 
5.2.8 Mutual Authentication 
 
The mutual authentication ensures that the 
participants authenticate one another during the 
same protocol. In proposed scheme, the involved 
participants authenticate one another on the basis of 
factors A and Vi. Both of these parameters are not 
easily accessible to an adversary, which is only 
possible with the disclosure of RC and Sj secrets. 
An adversary cannot decrypt PIDi to access A by 
computing (A||h(t)) = Dh(x||y) PIDi, for not having 
h(x||y). In addition, the access to Vi requires the 
knowledge of either BIOi and PWi, or h(x || y), 
which is not possible under normal conditions. 
 
5.2.9 Anonymous Authentication 
 
The anonymous authentication is meant for hiding 
the identity of user from outsiders during mutual 
authentication process. In proposed scheme, Ui 
submits its identity in the form of PIDi=Eh(x||y) (A|| 
h(t)), which is masked under the guise of t secret, 
as generated by Sj. The Sj recovers the dynamic 
identity parameter A by decrypting PIDi through 
h(x || y), which is utilized in further computation. 
In this manner, the proposed scheme provides 
anonymity to user Ui. 
 
5.2.10 Resists against Key-Compromise 
Impersonation attack (KCI) 
 
Our proposed scheme is resistant to KCI attack in 
comparison with Chen et al, Moon et al. and Wang 
et al. protocols, since the stolen smart contents can 
never help adversary in extracting the other useful 
parameters, for instance, Vi and A. Even if the 
parameter A is approached by an adversary by 
some means, it will not be able to compute Vi, 
which further requires access to h(x || y). Hence, 
the adversary cannot construct a legitimate Mij 
parameter by maliciously acquiring the parameter 
A, and in return, no key-compromise impersonation 
or server masquerading attack is possible against 
Ui. 
 
5.2.11 Password modification without RC 
participation 
 
In proposed scheme, the password can be easily 
modified by adopting the procedure as described in 
section 4.3, without having interaction with 
registration centre, unlike Chen and Lee, schemes. 
The Chen and Lee scheme cannot update the 
password without the engagement of registration 
centre. As in Chen and Lee the construction of Ri 
requires the use of password PWi, which is further 
used in the construction of Vi parameter, and in 
turn used in Ei parameter to be stored in smart card. 
Nonetheless, our scheme is capable of updating 
smart card parameter ‘W’ in accordance with the 
newly modified password PWi, without the 
involvement of registration centre. 
5.3 Security analysis using BAN logic  
 
This section demonstrates the security proof of 
proposed technique using Burrows-Abadi-
Needham logic (BAN) logic [44-45], which is a 
model that proves the protocol’s robustness related 
to mutual authentication between participants, key 
distribution to those participants, and resistance to 
session key exposure. In this logic, we employed 
principals, keys and nonces as defined below. 
 
Principals, acting as agents, participate in a 
protocol. 
Keys are meant for encryption using symmetric 
crypto- primitives. 
Nonces, in messages, are used to counter replay 
attacks. 
Some notations, as used in this proof, are described 
as under: 
 
𝕬 |≡ 𝕼: 𝕬 believes 𝕼. 
𝕬 ⊲ 𝕼: 𝕬 sees 𝕼 after receiving it. 
𝕬 | ~ 𝕼: 𝕬 once said 𝕼. i.e. In history, 𝕬 had 
transmitted 𝕼 and 𝕬 believed that when sent.  
𝕬 ⇒ 𝕼: 𝕬 has jurisdiction over 𝕼 and can behave 
as an authority over 𝕼 that might be trusted. 
♯ (𝕼): The message 𝕼 is produced fresh and not 
replayed. 
(𝕼)ℭ: The formulae 𝕼 is used in combination with 
formulae ℭ.  
(𝕼, ℭ): 𝕼 or ℭ being the part of message (𝕼, ℭ). 
𝕬  
     𝐊     
↔     𝕬′:  𝕬 and 𝕬′ can securely contact using 
the shared key K. 
 ⟨ 𝕼, ℭ ⟩K: 𝕼 or ℭ is encrypted using the key K. 
 
We state few logical postulates (rules) as used this 
logic analysis, in the following: 
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ℜ1. Message meaning postulate: 
𝕬|≡𝕬 
𝐾
↔ 𝕬′,   𝕬⊲⟨𝕼⟩ℭ
𝕬|≡𝕬′ |~ 𝕼
 
 
ℜ2. Nonce verification postulate: 
𝕬|≡ ♯ (𝕼),   𝕬|≡𝕬′ |~  𝕼
𝕬|≡𝕬′ |≡  𝕼
 
 
ℜ3. Jurisdiction postulate: 
𝕬|≡𝕬′ ⇒𝕼,   𝕬|≡𝕬′ |≡  𝕼
𝕬|≡ 𝕼
 
 
ℜ4. Freshness conjuncatenation 
postulate: 
𝕬|≡ ♯ (𝕼)
𝕬|≡ ♯ (𝕼,   ℭ)
 
 
ℜ5. Belief postulate: 
𝕬|≡(𝕼),   𝕬|≡(ℭ)  
𝕬|≡(𝕼,   ℭ) 
 
 
ℜ6. Session keys postulate:  
𝕬|≡ ♯ (𝕼),   𝕬|≡𝕬′ |≡  𝕼
𝕬|≡𝕬 
K
↔ 𝕬′
 
 
The proposed model should meet the following 
goals to strengthen its security using BAN logic, 
given the above postulates and assumptions. 
 
Goal1 : Sj |≡ Sj 
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      Ui 
Goal2 : Sj |≡ Ui |≡ Sj 
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      Ui 
Goal3 : Ui |≡ Sj 
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      Ui 
Goal4 : Ui |≡ Sj |≡ Sj 
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      Ui 
 
To proceed in this proof, first, the exchange 
messages need to be transformed into idealized 
form as depicted below. 
 
M1: Ui → Sj:  PIDi, ZIDi, Ni: {⟨A || h(t) ⟩h(x || y) , ⟨A, 
PIDi, Ni ⟩Vi , Ni} 
 
M2: Sj →Ui: Mij, Ti, Nj: {⟨Ti, Ni, Nj, SIDj⟩A, Vi, Ti, 
Nj } 
 
M3: Ui → Sj: Mij':  {⟨ SKij, Nj,  SIDj ⟩ A, Vi} 
 
Next, the following premises could be established 
to proceed further in logic proof. 
 
A1 :  Ui  |≡  ♯ Ni 
A2 :  Sj  |≡  ♯ Nj 
A3 : Ui  |≡  Sj  
   𝐴,   𝑉𝑖)  
↔      Ui  
A4 : Sj  |≡  Sj
   𝐴,   𝑉𝑖)  
↔       Ui  
A5 :  Ui  |≡  Sj  |≡  Ui  
   𝐴,   𝑉𝑖)  
↔        Sj  
A6 :  Sj  |≡  Ui  |≡  Ui   
   𝐴,   𝑉𝑖)  
↔       Sj  
A7 : Ui  |≡  Sj  ⇒  Mij  
A8 : Sj  |≡  Ui  ⇒  Mij'  
 
Further, the designed idealized forms (M1, M2 and 
M3) of the proposed model could be evaluated and 
tested, considering the above narrated premises and 
postulates. 
By using the above notations, rules, premises and 
idealizations, we get to the following derivations: 
Considering M1 and M3 of the idealized form: 
    M1: Ui → Sj: PIDi, ZIDi, Ni: {⟨A || h(t) ⟩h(x || y) , 
⟨A, PIDi, Ni ⟩Vi , Ni} 
 
    M3: Ui → Sj: Mij': {⟨ SKij, Nj,  SIDj ⟩ A, Vi} 
By applying seeing rule, we get 
S1: Sj ⊲ PIDi, ZIDi, Ni: {⟨A || h(t) ⟩h(x || y) , ⟨A, PIDi, 
Ni ⟩Vi , Ni} 
S2: Sj ⊲ Mij': {⟨ SKij, Nj,  SIDj ⟩ A, Vi} 
 
According to S1, S2, A3 and ℜ1, we say 
S3: Sj  |≡  Ui ~ PIDi, ZIDi, Ni: {⟨A || h(t) ⟩h(x || y) , 
⟨A, PIDi, Ni ⟩Vi , Ni} 
S4: Sj  |≡  Ui ~ {⟨ SKij, Nj,  SIDj ⟩ A, Vi} 
 
According to S3, S4, A1, ℜ4 and ℜ2, we say 
S5: Sj  |≡  Ui |≡  {⟨A || h(t) ⟩h(x || y) , ⟨A, PIDi, Ni ⟩Vi , 
Ni} 
S6: Sj  |≡  Ui |≡  {⟨ SKij, Nj,  SIDj ⟩ A, Vi} 
 
According to S5, S6, A4, A8 and ℜ3, we get 
S7: Sj  |≡  {⟨A || h(t) ⟩h(x || y) , ⟨A, PIDi, Ni ⟩Vi , Ni} 
 
S8: Sj  |≡  {⟨ SKij, Nj,  SIDj ⟩ A, Vi} 
 
Using S7, S8, A4, (SK= h(A || Ni || Nj || Vi || 
SIDj)) and ℜ6, we get 
S9: Sj |≡  Sj  
       𝑆𝐾     
↔      Ui  (Goal 1) 
According to S9, A6 we apply ℜ6 as 
S10: Sj |≡  Ui |≡  Sj  
       𝑆𝐾     
↔      Ui (Goal 2) 
Further, we consider M2 in idealized form: 
M2: Sj → Ui:  Mij, Ti, Nj: {⟨Ti, Ni, Nj, SIDj⟩A, Vi, Ti, 
Nj } 
By applying seeing rule, we get 
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S11: Ui ⊲ Mij':  {⟨Ti, Ni, Nj, SIDj⟩A, Vi, Ti, Nj } 
According to S11, A4 and ℜ1, we can say 
S12: Ui |≡  Sj ~ {⟨Ti, Ni, Nj, SIDj⟩A, Vi, Ti, Nj } 
According to S12, A2, ℜ4 and ℜ2, we say 
S13: Ui |≡ Sj |≡ {⟨Ti, Ni, Nj, SIDj⟩A, Vi, Ti, Nj } 
According to S13, A3, A7 and ℜ3, we get 
S14: Ui|≡ {⟨Ti, Ni, Nj, SIDj⟩A, Vi, Ti, Nj } 
From S14, A3, (SK= h(A || Ni || Nj || Vi || SIDj)), and 
ℜ6, we get 
S15: Ui |≡ Sj  
       𝑆𝐾      
↔      Ui  (Goal 3) 
According to S15, A5, we apply ℜ6 as 
S16: Ui |≡ Sj |≡ Sj  
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      Ui (Goal 4) 
 
Based on the above logical analysis, we could infer 
that the proposed model adheres to mutual 
authentication property that leads to the 
establishment of a mutually shared session key SK 
between Ui and Sj.  
 
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of 
proposed model with other multi-server 
authentication protocols, in terms of resistance 
against threats. The Table II depicts the analysis of 
security features for various protocols including 
Chen and Lee [24], Wang et al. [26], Moon et al. 
[25], which indicates our proposed scheme as a 
robust authentication protocol against those 
contemporary schemes. According to Table II, all 
of these three schemes [24-26] are found 
vulnerable to impersonation attack, KCI and trace 
attack. Besides, the Moon et al. does not provide 
anonymity and resistance to identity guessing and 
stolen smart card attacks. The Wang et al. fails to 
provide resistance to privileged insider attack and 
session-specific temporary information attack. 
Likewise, Chen and Lee could not provide session 
key security and resistance to stolen smart card 
attack and offline-password guessing attacks.   
 
Table II: Comparison of security-based features  
 Chen and 
Lee [24] 
Wang et 
al. [26] 
Moon et 
al. [25] 
Ours 
Anonymity Yes Yes No Yes 
Mutual Authentication Yes No No Yes 
Resist privileged insider Attack Yes No Yes Yes 
Resist Offline password guessing attack No Yes Yes Yes 
Resist Stolen smart card attack No Yes No Yes 
Resists Impersonation attack No No No Yes 
Resists Key-compromise impersonation  attack No No No Yes 
Session key security No Yes No Yes 
Resist Trace attack No No No Yes 
Resist session-specific temporary information 
attack 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Resists Identity guessing attack Yes Yes No Yes 
Efficient Password Modification No Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Table III. Operations cost comparison 
  Chen 
and Lee 
Wang 
et al. 
Moon et 
al. 
Ours 
Login  
& Authentication phase 
Server side 8Th 6Th 7Th 10Th 
User side 11Th 8Th 9Th 11Th 
Total  19Th 14 Th 16Th 21Th 
Computation cost (ms)  0.043 0.032 0.036 0.048 
Energy (μJ)  14.44 10.64 12.16 15.96 
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For comparing the costs, in Table III, we represent 
hash operation with Th while overlooking XOR 
function due to its insignificant cost. Hence, 
considering the given performance analysis, we can 
infer that our proposed technique is more secure 
than Wang et al., Moon et al., and Chen and Lee, 
schemes. All of these protocols are based on light-
weight SHA-1 hash-digest operations. The 
proposed scheme sustains a bit higher cost than 
Wang et al. and Moon et al. et al. schemes, and 
lower cost than Chen and Lee, however the 
proposed scheme provides more security than those 
schemes. In fact, all of these schemes can be 
regarded as light-weight, since hash-digest is 
regarded as a negligible operation in higher cost 
crypto-primitives, i.e. scalar point multiplication, 
exponentiation and bilinear operations. Therefore, 
all of these schemes can be regarded as equivalent 
in terms of computational cost. However, the 
immunity of our scheme against most of the 
identified threats turns the scale in its favor as 
shown in Table II.  
   According to Klinic [33], the hash operation 
assumes to take 0.0023ms time delay. Considering 
this, the cost of Chen and Lee, Wang et al., Moon 
et al., and proposed scheme amounts to 0.043ms, 
0.032ms, 0.036 and 0.048ms, respectively. 
Likewise, the schemes may be evaluated on the 
basis of energy requirements by taking the cost of 
SHA-1 as 0.76μJ for the computation of a single 
byte [54]. In this regard, the energy cost for the 
Chen and Lee, Wang et al., Moon et al., and 
proposed schemes will amount to 14.44 μJ, 10.64 
μJ, 12.16 μJ and 15.96μJ, respectively. Hence, 
considering the above performance evaluation, we 
can deduce that the proposed protocol is more 
secure than all schemes as analyzed, in almost an 
equivalent cost. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
This study reviews three multi-server 
authentication schemes, Chen and Lee, Wang et 
al., and Moon et al. aimed at maximizing the 
security in minimum cost. The Chen and Lee 
scheme was found susceptible to impersonation 
attack, trace attack, stolen smart card attack 
exposing session keys, key-compromise 
impersonation attack and inefficient password 
modification. The Wang et al. scheme does not 
provide resistance to trace attack, session-specific 
temporary information attack, key-compromise 
information attack, and privileged insider attack 
leading to session key disclosure and user 
impersonation attacks. The Moon et al. is prone to 
stolen smart card attack leading to further attacks, 
i.e. identity-guessing attack, user impersonation 
attack, key-compromise impersonation attack, and 
session keys disclosure. The proposed scheme 
presented its contribution with an improved 
version countering the identified threats. 
Besides, the proposed work incorporates logic-
based security analysis and the performance 
evaluation with contemporary schemes.  
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